Stop Using Your ISP’s Default DNS: How to Switch to a Private DNS
What private DNS really protects, what it does not, how to measure resolvers on your own connection, and how to set it up on a phone or router without overstating the benefits.
Every time you open a website or an app, your device first asks a DNS resolver to translate a name such as example.com into an IP address. By default that resolver is run by your internet provider, and the question is usually sent in plain text. Switching to another resolver, and encrypting the conversation with it, is a small configuration change with real effects on privacy, and sometimes on speed and reliability. It is also frequently oversold. This article explains what the change does and does not protect, how to measure the difference on your own connection, and how to set it up on a phone and a router.
What DNS exposes, and to whom
The Domain Name System, specified in the early standards RFC 1034 and RFC 1035, was designed for a smaller and more trusting internet. Classic DNS queries travel over UDP or TCP on port 53 without encryption. Anyone on the path between your device and the resolver, including the network operator, can read which names you look up, and the resolver itself keeps whatever logs its operator chooses. The list of domains you visit reveals a great deal about your habits even without the content of pages.
Two standards add encryption between your device and the resolver. DNS over TLS (RFC 7858) uses a dedicated port, 853. DNS over HTTPS (RFC 8484) carries queries inside ordinary HTTPS on port 443. Android's "Private DNS" setting, introduced in Android 9, uses DNS over TLS.
What a private DNS does not do
This is the part often left out. Encryption hides your queries from observers on the network. It does not hide them from the resolver you choose; you are moving trust from your ISP to another operator, and the privacy you gain depends on that operator's published policy and on your willingness to believe it. Providers state their logging practices in privacy policies, and some have commissioned external audits, but these are claims you should read rather than assume.
It also does not make you anonymous. After the lookup, your device still connects to the destination IP address, which an ISP can see, and the server name in the TLS handshake is, in many cases, still visible to the network; extensions such as Encrypted Client Hello aim to close that gap but are not universal. A private DNS is therefore one layer in a privacy setup, not a replacement for a VPN or for careful behaviour. It does not stop websites from tracking you with cookies or accounts.
Step one: measure before you change
The fastest resolver is not the same for everyone. It depends on your ISP, your location, and how traffic is routed. A simple method needs no third-party site. On a computer with the dig tool installed, run a query against a resolver and read the "Query time" line:
- dig @1.1.1.1 example.com
- dig @9.9.9.9 example.com
- dig example.com (your current default)
A single query is a poor measurement because of caching and noise. Repeat the test over many different domain names and at different times of day, discard the first request to each domain (which may need to be fetched from upstream), and compare medians rather than the best result. Browser-based benchmark sites exist and are convenient, but understand what they test: they may measure from your browser rather than your phone's resolver. Whatever you use, a difference of a few milliseconds is invisible in everyday browsing, because a page load involves many other delays. Speed should be a tiebreaker; reliability and trust in the operator matter more.
A small worked example
Suppose you test twenty popular domains on each of three resolvers. Resolver A has a median of 18 ms and a worst case of 90 ms, resolver B has a median of 22 ms and a worst case of 30 ms, and your ISP has a median of 12 ms and one failure in twenty. The numbers here are illustrative, not measurements. Which would you choose? A resolver that never fails and has consistent latency may serve you better than one with the lowest median. The failure rate is often the real reason to change.
Step two: configure it
Android. The setting is usually under Settings, then Network & Internet, then Private DNS, though the path varies by manufacturer. Choose the option to specify a provider hostname and enter the hostname, not an IP address. If you choose "Automatic", the phone upgrades to encrypted DNS only when your network's resolver supports it, so it is not the same guarantee as a specified provider.
Examples of hostnames published by well-known providers:
- one.one.one.one (Cloudflare)
- dns.quad9.net (Quad9, which blocks domains on threat lists)
- dns.adguard-dns.com (AdGuard, which blocks advertising and tracking domains by default)
- family.adguard-dns.com (AdGuard with adult-content filtering)
- unfiltered.adguard-dns.com (AdGuard without filtering)
Type these exactly as shown. Verify hostnames against the provider's own documentation, since entries can change. NextDNS, another option, lets you configure filtering and logging settings through an account; that flexibility means you should review the logging options you enable.
Router. Changing DNS on a home router applies to every connected device, including those with no setting of their own. Many routers support only plain DNS to the upstream resolver, in which case traffic from the router to the resolver is unencrypted even though you changed provider. Check whether your router firmware supports encrypted upstream DNS.
Self-hosted. Running your own resolver gives control but shifts the work of updates, security and uptime to you, and your ISP still sees the traffic leaving your resolver unless it forwards to an encrypted upstream. This is a project for people who want to learn, not a default recommendation.
Filtering resolvers, blocking and side effects
Resolvers that filter by domain can reduce exposure to known malicious sites and some advertising, but they are blunt tools. They can break legitimate sites or app features, and a block list is only as good as its maintenance. If an app suddenly fails after a change, switch back to test. Also note that DNS-level filtering does not replace endpoint security.
In some countries, ISPs implement content restrictions at the DNS level. Changing resolver may or may not affect that, as restrictions may also be applied by IP address or by inspecting connection metadata, and local rules vary. Be aware of the law where you live and do not assume a resolver change is a circumvention tool.
Integrity: DNSSEC and its limits
Encrypted transport protects the channel; it does not prove that the answer is correct. DNSSEC (RFC 4033 and related standards) adds digital signatures to DNS data so that a validating resolver can detect forged answers. It works only for domains that have signed their zones, and it does not hide your queries. A resolver that validates DNSSEC adds a measure of protection against tampering, but it is a separate feature from encryption, and the two should not be confused.
Limitations and open questions
- Resolver privacy claims are self-reported, and independent verification varies. The concentration of DNS queries in a few large providers is a concern in itself.
- Centralising lookups with a few operators may reduce resolution diversity, and some regional networks route to nearby resolvers better than distant global ones.
- Measured speed differences depend heavily on method; published comparisons are often snapshots from particular networks and times.
Questions worth testing
- On your own network, does a different resolver reduce failures or only change milliseconds?
- With a packet capture on a test network, can you confirm that port 53 traffic stops after enabling encrypted DNS?
- Does your router or any app bypass your setting by using its own resolver?
- What does the chosen provider's current privacy policy say about retention, and for how long?
References and further reading
- Mockapetris, P. (1987). Domain Names: Concepts and Facilities (RFC 1034) and Domain Names: Implementation and Specification (RFC 1035). IETF.
- Hu, Z. et al. (2016). Specification for DNS over Transport Layer Security (TLS) (RFC 7858). IETF.
- Hoffman, P. and McManus, P. (2018). DNS Queries over HTTPS (DoH) (RFC 8484). IETF.
- Arends, R. et al. (2005). DNS Security Introduction and Requirements (RFC 4033). IETF.
- Bortzmeyer, S. (2015). DNS Privacy Considerations (RFC 7626). IETF.